

Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 02562 01 OF 05 242247 Z

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 AF-10 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03 NEA-10

NSAE-00 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 GAC-01 USIA-12 TRSE-00

MBFR-03 SAJ-01 EB-11 SS-15 NSC-10 ACDA-19 OMB-01 IO-12

RSR-01 /157 W

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 229

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 5 USNATO 2562

E. O. 11652: GDS DEC 31, 1980

TAGS: MCAP, NATO

SUBJECT: DRAFT DPC MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE

REF: USNATO 2520

1. DEFENSE REVIEW COMMITTEE ON EVENING OF MAY 23, 1973
COMPLETED ITS REVIEW OF DRAFT MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE
WHICH HAS NOW BEEN PUBLISHED AS DPC/ D(73)8(DRAFT).
FIRST ELEVEN PARAGRAPHS REMAIN AS IN USNATO 2520
EXCEPT FOR FOLLOWING CHANGES:

A. PARA 2, LAST SENTENCE: CHANGE WORDS " MAY SEEM NEARER"
TO READ, " IS NEARER".

B. PARA 3, NEXT TO LAST SENTENCE: CHANGE WORDS " WITHOUT
MILITARY RISK" TO READ, " WITHOUT UNDUE MILITARY RISK."

C. PARA 7, AT END OF FIRST SENTENCE CHANGE WORDS,
" AND/ OR NUCLEAR MEANS" TO READ, " AND IF NECESSARY NUCLEAR MEANS."
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PAGE 02 NATO 02562 01 OF 05 242247 Z

D. PARA 7, LAST SENTENCE: CHANGE WORDS " WITH NUCLEAR WAR"
TO READ, " TO NUCLEAR WAR."

E. PARA 9, ADD THE FOLLOWING AS A NEW LEAD IN SENTENCE:

" THE MANNER AND EXTENT TO WHICH THE SOVIETS WOULD EXPLOIT THEIR MILITARY CAPABILITY IS CLOSELY RELATED TO NATO' S WILL AND CAPABILITY TO REACT AND TO THE SOVIET PERCEPTION OF THIS."

2. THE FOLLOWING IS A QUOTE OF PARAGRAPHS 12 THROUGH 37 OF DPC/ D(73)8(DRAFT). PARAGRAPHS 12, 13 AND 14 QUOTED BELOW SHOULD BE SUBSTITUTED FOR LIKE NUMBERED PARAGRAPHS IN USNATO 2520.

BEGIN TEXT:

12. THE WARSAW PACT HAS THE CAPABILITY TO MOUNT A DELIBERATE ATTACK ON A CONSIDERABLE SCALE (POSSIBLY UNDER COVER OF MANOEUVRES) WITH FORCES ALREADY IN POSITION, PARTICULARLY ON THE FLANKS. THE PROBABILITY OF THIS DEPENDS TO A LARGE DEGREE UPON NATO' S ABILITY TO SURVIVE AND REACT; NATO' S PLANNING MUST THEREFORE CONTINUE TO PROVIDE FOR THIS CONTINGENCY.

13. WE SHOULD EXPECT TO GET SOME WARNING, HOWEVER, BOTH POLITICAL AND MILITARY, OF A LARGE SCALE ATTACK ON NATO BY THE WARSAW PACT. FROM THE POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW AN ATTACK WOULD PROBABLY BE PRECEDED BY A PERIOD OF INCREASING TENSION AND DETERIORATING RELATIONS WHICH WOULD ALERT US TO THE POSSIBILITY OF HOSTILITIES. SUCH A DETERIORATION SHOULD BECOME MORE EASILY DETECTABLE AS THE NORMAL CLIMATE OF EAST- WEST RELATIONS IMPROVES.

14. THE SUBSEQUENT IDENTIFICATION OF WARSAW PACT MOVEMENTS OR INTENTIONS (I. E. MILITARY WARNING) IS A DIFFERENT MATTER. WE MIGHT GET LITTLE OR NO SUCH WARNING IF HOSTILITIES DEVELOPED OUT OF ACCIDENTAL CAUSES, THOUGH WE HAVE NOT ASSESSED THIS CONTINGENCY AS VERY PROBABLE. IT IS DIFFICULT TO ASSESS THE WARNING TIME WHICH MIGHT BE AVAILABLE TO NATO SHOULD THE WARSAW PACT DECIDE TO ATTACK WITHOUT PRIOR BUILD- UP. WE BELIEVE THAT THE PROBABILITY OF THEIR LAUNCHING AN ATTACK IN A
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 02562 01 OF 05 242247 Z

LIMITED GEOGRAPHICAL AREA WITHOUT MAKING PREPARATIONS TO CONDUCT HOSTILITIES ON A WIDER SCALE IS RELATIVELY LOW. WE CONSIDER IT VERY UNLIKELY THAT THE WARSAW PACT WOULD UNDERTAKE A DELIBERATE LARGE- SCALE ATTACK ON NATO WITHOUT A PRELIMINARY BUILD- UP OF GROUND FORCES IN THE FORWARD AREAS, CHANGES IN THE PATTERN OF AIR ACTIVITY AND CONCENTRATIONS OF NAVAL FORCES WHICH NATO WOULD BE BOUND TO DETECT. IT HAS BEEN ASSESSED THAT NATO WOULD RECEIVE CLEAR INDICATIONS OF SUCH AN IMPENDING LARGE- SCALE ATTACK NOT LESS THAN THREE DAYS IN ADVANCE OR PERHAPS AS MUCH AS EIGHT DAYS IN ADVANCE (1).

15. BY CLEAR INDICATIONS OF IMPENDING ATTACK, WE MEAN SUCH EVIDENCE AS WOULD JUSTIFY NATO GOVERNMENTS IN TAKING OVERT MILITARY COUNTERMEASURES OF A NATURE WHICH IN NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES

MIGHT BE REGARDED AS PROVOCATIVE. IT SHOULD BE ASSUMED, HOWEVER, THAT DURING THE PRECEDING PERIOD OF RISING TENSION NATO GOVERNMENTS WOULD BE WILLING TO UNDERTAKE SOME PREPARATIONS INCLUDING THE AUGMENTATION AND MOVEMENT OF FORCES.

(1) MC 161/72

STRATEGY AND NATO FORCES

16. THE AIM OF NATO'S STRATEGY AND MILITARY PLANNING IS TO ENSURE SECURITY THROUGH DETERRENCE. THE PRIMARY AIM IS TO DETER AN ATTACK BEFORE IT IS LAUNCHED. IN AN ERA OF BROAD STRATEGIC NUCLEAR PARITY DETERRENCE TO ALL FORMS OF AGGRESSION CANNOT BE CREDIBLY BASED UPON STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES ALONE; IT MUST, THEREFORE, BE PROVIDED BY THE OVERALL CAPABILITIES OF NATO FORCES. THE ALLIANCE HOWEVER DOES NOT NEED OR INTEND TO MATCH WARSAW PACT FORCE CAPABILITIES IN EVERY RESPECT BUT, MUST BE ABLE TO RESPOND IN AN APPROPRIATE MANNER TO AGGRESSION OF ANY KIND.

SECRET
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PAGE 01 NATO 02562 02 OF 05 242306 Z

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 AF-10 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03 NEA-10

NSAE-00 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 GAC-01 USIA-12 TRSE-00

MBFR-03 SAJ-01 EB-11 SS-15 NSC-10 ACDA-19 OMB-01 IO-12

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 230
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR
USLOSACLANT

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 5 USNATO 2562

REF: USNATO 2520

17. SHOULD AGGRESSION OCCUR, THE MILITARY AIM IS TO PRESERVE OR RESTORE THE INTEGRITY OF THE NATO AREA BY EMPLOYING SUCH FORCES AS MAY BE NECESSARY WITHIN THE CONCEPT OF FORWARD DEFENCE ON LAND OR AT SEA. NATO FORCES MUST BE PREPARED TO USE ANY FORCE CAPABILITY AT THEIR DISPOSAL, INCLUDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, IN THE CONTEXT OF DIRECT DEFENCE AND DELIBERATE

ESCALATION TO BRING HOME TO THE OTHER SIDE WITH UNMISTAKABLE
FORCE THE RISK OF CONTINUED AGGRESSION;
OR IN A GENERAL NUCLEAR RESPONSE.

18. TO MEET THESE AIMS, THE BASIC MILITARY POSTURE OF THE
ALLIANCE REQUIRES LAND, SEA AND AIR FORCES TO PROVIDE
INTERLOCKING MILITARY CAPABILITIES, INCLUDING:

(A) STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES, MANIFESTLY CAPABLE OF
INFLECTING UNACCEPTABLE DAMAGE ON THE SOVIET UNION EVEN
AFTER SURPRISE NUCLEAR ATTACK.

SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 02562 02 OF 05 242306 Z

(B) A CAPABILITY FOR THE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF THIS IS TO ADD TO THE DETERRENCE OF
CONVENTIONAL ATTACKS OF ANY MAGNITUDE, AND COUNTER THEM IF
NECESSARY, BY CONFRONTING THE ENEMY WITH THE PROSPECT OF
CONSEQUENT ESCALATION OF THE CONFLICT, AND TO DETER, AND IF
NECESSARY RESPOND TO, THE USE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS
BY POSING THE THREAT OF ESCALATION TO ALL- OUT NUCLEAR WAR.

(C) CONVENTIONAL FORCES, LAND, SEA AND AIR. THEY SHOULD BE
DESIGNED TO DETER AND SUCCESSFULLY COUNTER TO THE GREATEST
EXTENT POSSIBLE A LIMITED NON- NUCLEAR ATTACK AND TO DETER ANY
LARGER NON- NUCLEAR ATTACK BY CONFRONTING THE AGGRESSOR WITH THE
PROSPECT OF NON- NUCLEAR HOSTILITIES ON A SCALE THAT COULD
INVOLVE A GREAT RISK OF ESCALATION TO NUCLEAR WAR. IN THE EVENT
OF MAJOR NON- NUCLEAR AGGRESSION, NATO FORCES MUST BE CAPABLE
OF SUSTAINING A FORWARD DEFENCE WHICH WILL CONVINCE THE AGGRESSOR
THAT THE RISKS HAVE BEEN MISCALCULATED AND TO GIVE NATO
SUFFICIENT TIME FOR CONSULTATION AND TAKE ANY DECISION
TOWARDS ESCALATION OF THE CONFLICT.

19. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE PRECISELY THE DURATION OF
CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS SHOULD AGGRESSION TAKE THIS FORM. BUT
GIVEN THE ADVANTAGE OF INITIATIVE TO THE WARSAW PACT AND THE NEED
FOR NATO TO CONDUCT ITS DEFENCE AS FAR FORWARD AS POSSIBLE,
IN THE PRESENT BALANCE OF FORCES, A LARGE- SCALE CONVENTION
ATTACK BY THE WARSAW PACT AGAINST NATO EUROPE WOULD PROBABLY
BE FOLLOWED BY INTENSIVE HOSTILITIES LIKELY TO REQUIRE AN
EARLY DECISION ON THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WARSAW PACT
MILITARY DOCTRINE AND THE COMPOSITION AND STRUCTURE OF THEIR
LAND AND AIR FORCES SEEM TO INDICATE THAT THEIR CONCEPT OF
ATTACK ENVISAGES HIGHLY MOBILE CONCENTRATIONS OF FORCES WITH
GREAT FIREPOWER, INTENDED TO FORCE A QUICK BREAKTHROUGH OF NATO
DEFENCES IN ORDER TO ARRIVE AT DECISIVE MILITARY RESULTS BEFORE
THE IMMENSE MANPOWER AND MATERIAL RESOURCES OF THE ALLIANCE
CAN BE FULLY MOBILIZED. NATO FORCES SHOULD THEREFORE BE SO
COMPOSED, EQUIPPED AND DEPLOYED AS TO MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR
WARSAW PACT LEADERS TO CONCLUDE THAT SUCH TACTICS WILL ASSURE
THEM OF SUCCESS. THIS WILL REQUIRE INCREASED EMPHASIS ON

IMPROVEMENT IN NATO STANDING FORCES, PARTICULARLY IN THE EQUIPMENT FIELD, AND ON THE EARLY AVAILABILITY OF AUGMENTATION REINFORCEMENT AND MOBILIZATION FORCES.

SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 02562 02 OF 05 242306 Z

20. THE POSSIBILITY OF MORE PROLONGED HOSTILITIES FOLLOWING A LARGE SCALE CONVENTIONAL ATTACK CANNOT BE RULED OUT THOUGH THE EXTENT OF THESE WILL DEPEND ON THE CAPABILITIES OF NATO FORCES. ADDITIONALLY THERE IS THE POSSIBILITY OF HOSTILITIES OF SUBSTANTIAL DURATION ON A LESSER SCALE AND AT A LOWER LEVEL OF INTENSITY. SPECIAL PREPARATION AND PLANNING ARE NEEDED TO ENSURE THE EARLY AND EFFECTIVE DEPLOYMENT OF REINFORCEMENT, AUGMENTATION AND MOBILIZATION FORCES IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES.

21. THE POSSIBILITY OF A LARGE- SCALE MILITARY CONFLICT AT SEA, NOT ASSOCIATED WITH AN ATTACK ON LAND CANNOT BE IGNORED. HOWEVER, IT WOULD SEEM LIKELY THAT SUCH CONFLICT WOULD PROBABLY BE ASSOCIATED WITH HOSTILITIES ON LAND OR WOULD LEAD TO A LAND/ AIR CONFLICT UNLESS BROUGHT TO A CONCLUSION AT AN EARLY STAGE. FURTHERMORE, NATO MARITIME FORCES COULD BE CALLED UPON TO SUSTAIN OPERATIONS AT A HIGHER THAN PEACETIME RATE OF INTENSITY POSSIBLY, BUT NOT NECESSARILY, INCLUDING ACTUAL HOSTILITIES, OVER A CONSIDERABLE PERIOD OF TIME.

CHARACTERISTICS OF NATO FORCES

22. CERTAIN FURTHER CONCLUSIONS MAY BE DRAWN AS TO THE NATURE OF THE CONVENTIONAL FORCES REQUIRED:

(A) THEY SHOULD BE EQUIPPED, DEPLOYED, TRAINED AND MAINTAINED IN A STATE OF READINESS, CONSISTENT WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE FORWARD DEFENCE CONCEPT AND THE NEED TO RETAIN THE FREE USE OF THE SEAS;

SECRET

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PAGE 01 NATO 02562 03 OF 05 242355 Z

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 AF-10 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03 NEA-10

NSAE-00 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 GAC-01 USIA-12 TRSE-00

MBFR-03 SAJ-01 EB-11 SS-15 NSC-10 ACDA-19 OMB-01 IO-12

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SECDEF WASHDC
INFO USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR
USLOSACLANT

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 5 USNATO 2562

REF: USNATO 2520

(B) NATO FORCES SHOULD BE SO COMMANDED, ORGANIZED, EQUIPPED AND DEPLOYED AS TO DEMONSTRATE CLEARLY THE COHESION OF THE ALLIANCE, AND PROVIDE TANGIBLE EVIDENCE TO A POTENTIAL AGGRESSOR THAT AN ATTACK ON ONE COUNTRY IS INDEED AN ATTACK UPON ALL;

(C) IMMEDIATE REACTION FORCES(1) SHOULD BE AVAILABLE ON A MULTINATIONAL BASIS UNDER NATO COMMAND TO DEMONSTRATE ALLIED COMMITMENT TO A THREATENED AREA IN TIMES OF TENSION. THIS SPECIAL CATEGORY OF FORCES SHOULD BE HELD AT A HIGH STATE OF READINESS AND BE READILY MOBILE;

(D) PARTICULAR EMPHASIS SHOULD BE PLACED ON EFFECTIVE FORCES READY AND AVAILABLE IN OR NEAR THEIR BATTLE POSITIONS IN PEACETIME. THESE INCLUDE RESERVE, REINFORCEMENT OR AUGMENTATION FORCES THAT CAN BE EFFECTIVELY DEPLOYED DURING THE POSSIBLE WARNING TIME (SEE PARAGRAPHS 12-15 ABOVE) OR WHICH COULD BE EMPLOYED SO AS TO AFFECT THE INITIAL STAGES OF HOSTILITIES. MOBILIZATION SYSTEMS MUST BE CAPABLE

SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 02562 03 OF 05 242355 Z

OF GENERATING FORCES WITHIN THIS PERIOD;

(E) PROVISION MUST BE MADE, HOWEVER, FOR THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF NATO MILITARY FORCES THROUGH MOBILIZATION AND THROUGH THE REASSIGNMENT OF EXISTING NATIONAL FORCES AS THEY MAY BECOME AVAILABLE;

(F) IN ADDITION, MARITIME FORCES SHOULD HAVE THE ABILITY TO DEPLOY FORCES IN PEACETIME TO OFFSET THE POLITICAL EFFECTS OF SOVIET MARITIME ACTIVITIES.

(1) DPC/ D(68)15, PARAGRAPH 3(A), 3 RD MAY, 1968

23. UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE AD 70 PROGRAMME, DETAILED RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF NATO FORCE CAPABILITIES WERE MADE AND HIGH PRIORITY AREAS ESTABLISHED AND APPROVED. THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE GUIDED BY THE RECOMMENDATIONS AND APPROVED PRIORITY AREAS IN FORMULATING THEIR FORCE PROPOSALS 1975-80. HOWEVER, THEY SHOULD MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO NEW PRIORITIES WHERE JUDGED APPROPRIATE IN THE LIGHT OF NEW DEVELOPMENTS.

24. NATO'S CAPABILITY FOR THE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHOULD BE OF SUCH A CHARACTER AND SO DEPLOYED AND ORGANIZED AS TO PRESENT THE AGGRESSOR WITH THE CLEAR RISK THAT AN ATTACK ON NATO AT ANY LEVEL MAY ESCALATE INTO THE NUCLEAR DIMENSION, WHILE PRESERVING FOR NATO AS MUCH FLEXIBILITY AS POSSIBLE IN THE EXERCISE OF THAT OPTION.

TECHNOLOGY

25. TECHNOLOGY IS ONE SECTOR OF THE MILITARY BALANCE IN WHICH NATO AT PRESENT RETAINS AN OVERALL ADVANTAGE OVER THE WARSAW PACT. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE SOVIETS ARE APPLYING A GREAT AND INCREASING EFFORT IN THE FIELD OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY. BY THE END OF THE DECADE WE MAY BE MATCHED OR OVERTAKEN BY THE SOVIET UNION IN SEVERAL CRITICAL AREAS.

26. THE AVAILABILITY OF NEW DEVICES FOR SUCH PURPOSES AS TARGET ACQUISITION, SUBMARINE AND AIRCRAFT DETECTION, BATTLEFIELD SURVEILLANCE, BARRIERS, COMMAND AND CONTROL, NIGHT
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 02562 03 OF 05 242355 Z

FIGHTING, COMMUNICATIONS, ELECTRONIC WARFARE AND GREATER ACCURACY AND LETHALITY IN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS OFFERS NATO THE OPPORTUNITY OF SOME SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENTS IN CERTAIN AREAS OF ITS DEFENCES. NATO SHOULD DEVOTE SUBSTANTIAL AND CO-ORDINATED EFFORT TO THE EXPLOITATION OF TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS WHICH OPTIMISE THE MILITARY VALUE OF THE ECONOMIC AND MANPOWER RESOURCES AVAILABLE.

27. THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES, IN CONJUNCTION WITH NATIONS, SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES WHICH WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR THE CURRENT FORCE PLANNING PERIOD. FOR THE LONGER TERM, THEY SHOULD MAINTAIN A CONTINUING SURVEY OF THE RANGE OF TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES AND THE IMPACT OF THE RESULTANT WEAPON SYSTEMS FROM BOTH THE DETERRENT AND DEFENSIVE POINT OF VIEW.

RESOURCES

28. IT HAS BEEN ASSESSED THAT THE RAPID RATE OF GROWTH ACHIEVED IN THE WEST DURING THE SIXTIES WILL BE CONTINUED DURING THE SEVENTIES, PROBABLY AT THE EXPENSE OF A SUBSTANTIAL RATE OF INFLATION. THE AVERAGE ANNUAL RATE OF GROWTH THROUGHOUT NATO IS ASSESSED AT 4.7 PERCENT. THIS WOULD MEAN AN ADDITION TO THE TOTAL RESOURCES (GNP) OF NATO COUNTRIES OF MORE THAN \$100,000 MILLION PER YEAR IN REAL TERMS; THIS IS NOT MUCH LESS THAN THE TOTAL OF DEFENCE EXPENDITURES OF ALL MEMBER COUNTRIES IN 1972.

SECRET
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PAGE 01 NATO 02562 04 OF 05 250008 Z

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 AF-10 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03 NEA-10

NSAE-00 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 GAC-01 USIA-12 TRSE-00

MBFR-03 SAJ-01 EB-11 SS-15 NSC-10 ACDA-19 OMB-01 IO-12

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SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USNMR SHAPE

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S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 5 USNATO 2562

REF: USNATO 2520

29. THE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK FOR THE WARSAW PACT IS A RATE OF GROWTH VERY CLOSE TO THE NATO AVERAGE, I. E. ABOUT 4.5 PERCENT. HOWEVER, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF GNP ALLOTTED BY THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES TO DEFENCE IS BEING MAINTAINED AT A LEVEL CONSIDERABLY HIGHER THAN THE AVERAGE FOR NATO. MOREOVER THE PROPORTION OF THE PRESENT WARSAW PACT DEFENCE PROGRAMMES DEVOTED TO EQUIPMENT DEVELOPMENT AND PROCUREMENT APPEARS TO REPRESENT A MORE EFFECTIVE USE OF THE RESOURCES AVAILABLE.

30. IN NATO, HOWEVER, THE INCREASING COSTS OF MILITARY MANPOWER ARE IN MANY CASES REDUCING THE PROPORTION OF NATIONAL DEFENCE BUDGETS AVAILABLE FOR OPERATING COSTS AND FOR MODERNIZATION AND RE- EQUIPMENT. TWO ADDITIONAL FACTORS INTENSIFY THE PROBLEM. FIRSTLY, THE NEW- GENERATION EQUIPMENT IS COMMONLY MORE COMPLEX AND THEREFORE MORE COSTLY THAN THAT REPLACED; SECONDLY, THE EFFECTS OF INFLATION GENERALLY WEIGH MORE HEAVILY UPON DEFENCE BUDGETS THAN UPON NATIONAL ECONOMIES

SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 02562 04 OF 05 250008 Z

AS A WHOLE. THUS MERE COMPENSATION FOR INCREASES IN PRICES AND COSTS IN THE DEFENCE PROGRAMME AT THE RATE APPLICABLE TO THE CIVILIAN SECTOR PROVIDES NO ADEQUATE SOLUTION.

31. THERE IS ALREADY AN IMBALANCE BETWEEN THE CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES OF THE WARSAW PACT AND THOSE OF NATO. MAJOR INCREASES IN THE PRESENT SIZE OF NATO FORCES ARE NOT TO BE EXPECTED PRIMARILY ON THE PRACTICAL GROUNDS OF THE AVAILABILITY

AND COST OF MANPOWER. THIS MAKES IT ALL THE MORE NECESSARY TO CONCENTRATE INCREASED EFFORTS ON IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF FORCES. THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES SHOULD ENSURE, IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH COUNTRIES, THAT CURRENTLY AUTHORIZED LEVELS OF MANPOWER ARE APPLIED AS EFFICIENTLY AS POSSIBLE. ADDITIONAL RESOURCES SHOULD BE DEVOTED TO RE- EQUIPMENT AND MODERNIZATION, AND TO IMPROVING THE READINESS, FLEXIBILITY AND SURVIVABILITY OF FORCES. IN VERY FEW CASES CAN IT BE CLAIMED ON PURELY ECONOMIC GROUNDS THAT SUCH RESOURCES COULD NOT BE MADE AVAILABLE. ECONOMIC GROWTH AND FINANCIAL AND SOCIAL STABILITY CONSTITUTE A VITAL BASE FOR THE SECURITY OF ALL COUNTRIES OF THE ALLIANCE. BUT THE CONVERSE IS ALSO TRUE; NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE COMMON DEFENCE OF THE ALLIANCE MUST CONTINUE TO RECEIVE A PROPER PROPORTION OF INCREASING NATIONAL WEALTH.

32. IN DECEMBER LAST WE CALLED UPON NATIONS TO MAKE A SPECIAL EFFORT BEGINNING IN 1973(1). FOR THE DEFENCE PLANNING PERIOD UP TO 198. THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES SHOULD THEREFORE BASE THEIR FORCE PROPOSALS ON THE FOLLOWING ASSUMPTION:

(FORMULA 1 THAT ALL COUNTRIES WILL MAINTAIN THEIR 1973 LEVELS OF EXPENDITURE(2) IN REAL TERMS, AS FAR AS PERSONNEL AND MAINTENANCE COSTS ARE CONCERNED, RAISING THE ACTUAL MONETARY EXPENDITURES BY AT LEAST THE AMOUNTS NECESSARY TO MEET INCREASES IN PAY RATES AND PRICES IN THE DEFENCE SECTOR. THE PURCHASING POWER OF EXPENDITURE ON MAJOR EQUIPMENT(2) TO BE INCREASED BY A MINIMUM OF 10 PERCENT YEARLY OVER THE PLANNING PERIOD UNTIL IT REPRESENTS 20 PERCENT OF TOTAL DEFENCE EXPENDITURES.)

OR

(FORMULA 2 THAT ALL COUNTRIES WILL DEVOTE TO NATO DEFENCE PURPOSES, WHERE THIS IS WITHIN THEIR ECONOMIC CAPABILITY, A STABLE AND POSSIBLY LARGER PROPORTION(1) OF THEIR GROWING SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 02562 04 OF 05 250008 Z

NATIONAL WEALTH, AS AGREED IN PREVIOUS GUIDANCE.)

OR

(FORMULA 3 THAT ALL COUNTRIES WILL AIM TO DEVOTE TO NATO DEFENCE PURPOSES, WHERE THIS IS WITHIN THEIR CAPABILITY, A STABLE AND POSSIBLY LARGER PROPORTION(2) OF THEIR GROWING NATIONAL WEALTH, AS AGREED IN PREVIOUS GUIDANCE; THAT COUNTRIES MAINTAIN AT LEAST THEIR 1972 LEVELS OF EXPENDITURE IN REAL TERMS(3) AS FAR AS PERSONNEL AND MAINTENANCE COSTS ARE CONCERNED, AND INCREASE THE REAL LEVEL OF EXPENDITURE ON EQUIPMENT OVER THE PLANNING PERIOD.)

33. IN CERTAIN COUNTRIES OF THE ALLIANCE, THE PROVISION OF ADEQUATE RESOURCES FOR DEFENCE PRESENTS A SPECIAL PROBLEM. THE STAGE IN THEIR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MEANS THAT THEY ARE TO A GREAT EXTENT DEPENDENT ON AID FROM OTHER MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE FOR MEETING FORCE GOALS AND FOR THE MODERNIZATION OF EQUIPMENT. IN FORMULATING THEIR PROPOSALS THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES SHOULD

TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE PROBABLE SCALE OF SUCH AID, IN CONSULTATION
WITH THE COUNTRIES ABLE AND WILLING TO PROVIDE IT.

(1) DPC/ D(72)42, PARAGRAPH 3(F), 14 TH DECEMBER, 1972

(2) NATO DEFINITION

(3) I. E. RAISING THE ACTUAL MONETARY EXPENDITURES SUFFICIENTLY
TO COVER INCREASES IN PRICES AND COSTS

SECRET
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PAGE 01 NATO 02562 05 OF 05 250035 Z

70
ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 AF-10 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03 NEA-10

NSAE-00 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 GAC-01 USIA-12 TRSE-00

MBFR-03 SAJ-01 EB-11 SS-15 NSC-10 ACDA-19 OMB-01 IO-12

RSR-01 /157 W
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R 241950 Z MAY 73
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 233
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR
USLOSACLANT

S E C R E T SECTION 5 OF 5 USNATO 2562

REF: USNATO 2520

OVERALL DEFENCE PLANNING

34. IN ADDITION IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO SEEK OTHER METHODS
TO OPTIMISE THE MILITARY VALUE OF THE RESOURCES WHICH NATO
COUNTRIES ARE PREPARED TO MAKE AVAILABLE. ONE IS TO EXTEND,
WHEREVER PRACTICABLE, THE PRINCIPLE OF STANDARDIZATION OF
EQUIPMENT, DOCTRINE AND PROCEDURE; IN THIS WAY WE CAN EXPECT TO
EXPLOIT MORE EFFECTIVELY THE TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANTAGES DESCRIBED
ABOVE; A SECOND, NO LESS IMPORTANT, IS TO ENCOURAGE THE EXTENSION
OF COOPERATION AND JOINT EFFORTS (SUCH AS NADGE) BETWEEN
COUNTRIES. THERE IS ALSO A REQUIREMENT TO ENSURE THE CORRECT BALANCE
AND INTER- RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FORCE PLANNING AND SUPPORTING
PROGRAMMES. SOME OF THESE ARE NOW A NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
E. G. LOGISTICS, CIVIL PREPAREDNESS, CIVIL SUPPORT OF MILITARY
REQUIREMENTS AND REAR AREA SECURITY. OTHERS, SUCH AS NATO
INFRASTRUCTURE, REPRESENT A COLLECTIVE EFFORT. ALL ARE ELEMENTS

OF NATO' S OVERALL DEFENCE EFFORT AND REPRESENT A DEMAND ON
THE TOTAL RESOURCES AVAILABLE FOR THIS PURPOSE. THE NATO
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 02562 05 OF 05 250035 Z

MILITARY AUTHORITIES ARE INVITED TO STUDY THE FEASIBILITY OF
RATIONALIZATION AND SPECIALIZATION IN NATO FORCE PLANNING.
THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES ARE ALSO INVITED TO HOLD
APPROPRIATE CONSULTATION WITH NATIONAL AUTHORITIES ON ALL
THESE POINTS.

PRIORITIES

35. IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN THE BEST MILITARY VALUE
FROM THE RESOURCES AVAILABLE WITHOUT A REALLY VIGOROUS
INTERPRETATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF PRIORITIES. WITHIN THE
FRAMEWORK OF AD 70 PRIORITIES THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES
SHOULD SEEK TO ENSURE THAT EXISTING FORCE CAPABILITIES
ARE EFFECTIVELY MAINTAINED AND THAT ANY ADDITIONAL RESOURCES
AVAILABLE ARE DEVOTED PRIMARILY TO:

(A) CAPABILITIES WHICH CONTRIBUTE DIRECTLY TO DETERRENCE;

(B) CAPABILITIES WHICH CAN BE DEPLOYED RAPIDLY WITHIN THE
POSSIBLE PERIOD OF WARNING TIME (PARAGRAPHS 12-15) OR TO
AFFECT THE INITIAL STAGES OF HOSTILITIES;

(C) MEASURES WHICH IMPROVE THE QUALITY AND READINESS OF
FORCES AVAILABLE FOR EARLY USE.

GUIDANCE

36. IN THE LIGHT OF THE GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS SET OUT ABOVE,
THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES ARE INVITED TO FORWARD BY
1 ST FEBRUARY, 1974 FORCE PROPOSALS FOR THE PLANNING PERIOD
UP TO 1980 WHICH:

(A) ARE CONSISTENT WITH AND IN SUPPORT OF THE CURRENT
STRATEGIC CONCEPT;

(B) CONFORM TO THE FORCE CHARACTERISTICS DESCRIBED IN
PARAGRAPH 22;

(C) ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE APPROVED AD 70 HIGH PRIORITY
AREAS(1) AND WHICH RECOGNIZE THE CRITERIA SET OUT IN
PARAGRAPH 35. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE NATO MILITARY
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 02562 05 OF 05 250035 Z

AUTHORITIES SHOULD MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO NEW PRIORITIES
WHERE JUDGED APPROPRIATE;

(D) TAKE INTO ACCOUNT TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES WHICH COULD
BECOME AVAILABLE DURING THE CURRENT FORCE PLANNING
PERIOD (PARAGRAPH 26);

(E) ASSUME AN OVERALL INCREASE IN THE ALLOCATION OF
RESOURCES AS INDICATED IN PARAGRAPH 32;

(F) RECOGNIZED THE ELEMENTS OF OVERALL DEFENCE PLANNING
DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 34.

37. ADDITIONALLY, THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES ARE INVITED
TO:

(A) MAINTAIN A CONTINUING SURVEY OF THE RANGE OF
TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES AND THE IMPACT OF THE RESULTANT
WEAPON SYSTEMS FROM BOTH THE DETERRENT AND DEFENCE POINT
OF VIEW;

(B) CARRY OUT THE STUDIES AND CONSULTATIONS DESCRIBED
IN PARAGRAPH 34.

(1) DPC/ D(71)27, 29 TH NOVEMBER, 1971

END TEXT

RUMSFELD

SECRET

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Message Attributes

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Concepts: n/a
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Draft Date: 24 MAY 1973
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
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Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: boyleja
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
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Executive Order: N/A
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Reference: USNATO 2520
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Review Authority: boyleja
Review Comment: n/a
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